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Abstract
The reasons pushing parties to politicize non-economic dimensions of
competition, and the consequences of this for the representation of public opinion,
are badly understood in the party competition literature. This is a pressing
research gap, especially given the recent and significant re-activation of territorial
or center-periphery conflicts in Western Europe. In this paper, we first argue that
bad macro-economic performance increases the incentives of incumbent parties
to deviate the attention towards territorial conflicts in order to avoid electoral
punishment. Secondly, we also argue that the opposite is true for public opinion: it
is precisely during periods of bad economic performance and high economic concern,
when the electorate moves away from territorial interests. The dynamic emerging
from our findings is thus far from an ideal bottom-up representation: elites divert the
attention towards territorial conflicts to mask periods of poor economic performance,
which is precisely when public opinion is less interested in center-periphery issues.
We validate our claims using text analysis of party attention in Spain, and time
series models covering four electoral cycles (1996-2011).
∗The order of authors names reflects the principle of rotation. Both authors have contributed equally
to all work.
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1 Introduction
Understanding why parties emphasize some issues over others has important implications
for the analysis of party competition strategies and political representation. Political
scientists have been increasingly interested in how parties modify the saliency of different
issue dimensions in order to increase their electoral returns (Adams et al., 2004, 2006;
Adams, Haupt and Stoll, 2009; Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009; Rovny, 2012; Clark,
2013; Hobolt and de Vries, 2015). Economic left-right issues have dominated the scholarly
agenda over the last decades, but the analysis of when and why elites decide to emphasize
non-economic dimensions lags quite behind (Tavits and Potter, 2015). While immigration,
socio-cultural values or ethnicity are increasingly studied, the analysis of territorial or
centre-periphery conflicts is particularly absent (Rovny, 2015; Field and Hamann, 2015;
Alonso, Cabeza and Gomez, 2015). Moreover, the link between party strategies and
public opinion is usually ignored or under-theorized in previous literature. For instance,
it is unclear whether the puzzling and very significant rise of territorial conflicts and
secessionist movements in some Western European societies has been fueled by party
strategy, or vice versa.
This paper aims to fill these two related gaps: why do parties decide to emphasize
territorial issues over economic ones, and what are the consequences of this party strategy
on public opinion issue priorities? While the literatures on party competition and public
opinion responsiveness tend to grow in parallel, we believe that combining them can
lead to a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of political representation on
these less well-understood second dimensions of competition. On the basis of issue
entrepreneurship theories expecting parties to give more weight to alternative and more
favorable dimensions of competition (Riker, 1986; Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Hobolt
and de Vries, 2015), our Incumbent Diversion Hypothesis argues that the incentives of
governing parties to highlight center-periphery issues will increase when the economy
goes badly. However, contrary to the assumption that party emphasis on identity and
territorial matters will mitigate political unrest among disadvantaged social strata in bad
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times (Solt, 2001), our Exogenous Public Opinion Hypothesis argues that mainstream
electorates will not easily adopt party cues when experiencing economic unrest.
We test our hypotheses using content analysis techniques of parliamentary speeches
in Spain covering four electoral cycles (1996-2011), and time series analyses regressing
monthly party issue emphasis on macro-economic fluctuations, public opinion concerns,
and media attention. The geographical and temporal scope of this case study is ideal
for three reasons. First, the Spanish political spectrum is basically characterized by a
two-dimensional and relatively cross-cutting structure composed of a left-right economic
dimension, and a centre-periphery or nationalistic one (Sanchez-Cuenca and Dinas, 2012).
This ensures a certain level of public demand for representation on those two axes of
competition, which has been pointed out as a necessary condition for second dimensions
to operate (Tavits and Potter, 2015). Second, the time span covered in our analysis
encompasses very high levels of economic variation, from sustained economic growth
until a dramatic financial meltdown with sky-rocketing levels of debt and unemployment.
This allows us to more easily identify the effect of economic indicators on party
emphasis. Third, this time span has an unusual degree of variation in government’s
ideological orientation, including two single-party mainstream right governments, and two
single-party mainstream left governments. More importantly, both right and left-wing
incumbents experienced good and bad economic times, which allows us to disentangle
ideological orientation and economic performance in a way that a cross-country analysis
would not allow us to do.
Our contribution is three-fold. First, we confirm that state-wide incumbents turn to
territorial issues when the economy goes badly, and that this strategy is not driven
by regional parties. Contrary to what it has been shown in past research for other
non-economic dimensions based on social or cultural issues (Tavits and Potter, 2015),
however, party strategies on territorial dimensions do not respond to a left-right
logic, but rather to an incumbent-opposition logic (Seeberg, 2013; Schumacher et al.,
2015). The unusual variation of macro-economic conditions within ideologically different
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incumbencies in our case study shows how both right-wing and left-wing incumbents
tend to focus on territorial matters to divert attention from bad performance. Our
results are rather consistent with Solaz and De Vries (2017) in this volume, who expect
governments to emphasise libertarian-authoritarian dimensions (on the basis of expert
surveys) when macro-economic conditions deteriorate. This stresses the importance of
government-opposition dynamics, and confirms strong diversion strategies in a variety of
second-dimension issues, contexts, and ways to measure party emphasis (parliamentary
speeches and expert surveys).
Second, we show that diversion strategies can also be adopted by the winners of primary
and more established dimensions of competition as a proactive strategy to mimise
potential electoral losses (Schumacher et al., 2015). This extends recent research based on
heresthetics and issue entrepreneurship, which usually focuses on niche, small, or losing
parties in the primary political dimension to be the ones more likely to reshuﬄe the
structure of party competition.
Third, we show that the effectiveness of party strategy in shaping the public’s priorities
is more limited than usually assumed. Our findings are consistent with the literature on
framing effects, showing that party cues do not easily penetrate personal experiences and
ideological orientations (Zaller, 1992; Flynn, Brendan and Reifler, 2017). This means,
for example, that the recent increase in secessionism and territorial concerns in Western
Europe (i.e. Scotland and Catalan cases) are not primarily due to party rhetoric, as
sometimes assumed. While other studies in this volume focus on the consequences of party
strategies for accountability and responsibility attribution (Solaz and De Vries, 2017), our
analysis focuses on representation and congruence between parties’ and public opinion’s
agendas. Our findings reveal a pessimistic pattern of representation in centre-periphery
issues: while public opinion is less concerned about second political dimensions precisely
when economic performance is poor and economic worries are prominent, the opposite is
true for governing parties.
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2 Territorial conflicts as a political dimension of
competition
Previous research on party strategy and issue positioning has overwhelmingly focused
on economic dimensions of competition. Economic issues are usually summarized in
reliable left-right scales that have proved to be useful heuristics for voting behavior,
and strong anchors structuring party competition (Huber, 1989; Castles and Mair, 1984;
Benoit and Laver, 2006). The state redistribution vs. free market axis with roots in social
class conflicts has started to give way to newer and more or less orthogonal dimensions.
These second dimensions of competition are a major distinctive feature of post-industrial
societies. They have received a myriad of names in the literature, but they usually
summarize social, cultural, or moral issues that are not economic in nature (Kitschelt,
1994, 1995).
Identity is a key component of non-economic dimensions of competition, which tend
to confront nationalistic and cosmopolitan views of the world (Kriesi et al., 2008).
Traditionalist and nationalistic views have increased their popularity amongst left-wing
and right-wing populist parties and electorates. These views tend to frame globalization,
free transnational markets, blurred European borders, and immigration, as the triggers
of a new distribution of winners and losers in post-industrial economies. The political
economy literature has started to gain interest in identity-based considerations explaining
why poor people do not always prefer redistribution (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Shayo,
2009), or why some people do not vote according to their economic interests (Finseraas,
2008).
While identity, cultural values, and immigration are attracting most of the current
scholarly attention, territorial lines of conflict are a key but understudied second dimension
of competition in the issue competition literature (Amat, 2012). Political and economic
disparities across regions have increased dramatically in a globalized world, where some
territories attract more foreign investment, tourism, and highly skilled workers than others
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within the confines of the same national state. Perhaps because of this, mainstream vs.
populist patterns of electoral competition are more territorialized than ever. For instance,
inter-regional disparities in radical right or anti-immigrant voting are now even bigger
than disparities between individuals and national states (Golder, 2016).
Apart from the pivotal role of regions in current conflicts over redistribution and
recognition typical of global advanced democracies, territorial concerns can also tap
into a classical centre-periphery dimension of political conflict. Centre-periphery conflicts
concern the structure of authority within the state, where political actors in territorially
distinct communities contest the state’s right to rule uniformly across its territory (Elias,
Szocsik and Zuber, 2015). This line of conflict is typically found in some regions that
did not completely adapt to the political, cultural, and institutional homogenization
undertaken by political elites in national states emerging from the XVI century onward
(Tilly, 1975). Over time, some constituencies in those regions have crystallized a
permanent line of conflict against the central state, demanding more political and fiscal
autonomy, cultural recognition, and even secession.
Even if this type of nationalistic demands does not necessarily fit well into libertarian vs.
authoritarian axes of competition, it can constitute a second dimension of competition
by itself. In fact, (Rovny and Polk, 2018) in this issue show how economic and cultural
dimensions are actually fused in a single axis of competition in predominantly Catholic
societies where secular-religious cleavages were strong. This description fits well our
Spanish case study, where territorial and not cultural conflicts are arguably the second key
dimension of competition (Sanchez-Cuenca and Dinas, 2012). Since Lipset and Rokkan’s
seminal contribution on the freezing of modern party systems (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967),
the centre-periphery cleavage has generated less research and more inconclusive findings
than other types of conflict along social class or religious denomination lines (Evans and
Graaf, 2013). The recent rise in secessionist sentiment in Western Europe (the Scottish
and Catalan cases being the most paradigmatic examples), however, shows that territorial
politics can still have major political consequences, even in moderate political spaces and
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established democracies.
Despite the increasing importance of non-economic dimensions of competition and
centre-periphery conflicts more specifically, the current knowledge about when and why
parties will prefer to engage with those issues over classical economic issues is still
limited. In the scarce research on the topic, regional parties are assumed to be the key
entrepreneurs of territorial conflicts. In an important contribution, for instance, Alonso,
Cabeza and Gomez (2015) show how regionalist parties in Spain strategize simultaneously
along territorial and economic dimensions of competition, while state-wide parties react
to the presence of regionalist opponents by incorporating the territorial dimension into
the agenda. However, less is known about whether state-wide mainstream parties use
territorial conflicts to their advantage, regardless of what smaller regional parties do. In
fact, Field and Hamann (2015) show that regional parties in Spain only frame a small
share of their policy proposals in center-periphery terms. This is consistent with the idea
that regional parties are more mainstream than niche, and operate in a two-dimensional
structure exactly as state-wide parties do (Rovny, 2015). Apart from knowing little about
how state-wide parties use center-periphery dimensions to their advantage, the study of
the impact of party rhetoric on the intensity of territorial concerns among the population
is usually either assumed or ignored (Solt, 2001).
3 Theoretical expectations
The literature on issue competition and responsiveness focuses on when and why parties
will highlight some issue over others, and the extent to which public opinion is a driver
of political parties’ agendas (Adams, Haupt and Stoll, 2009; Adams and Somer-Topcu,
2009). While previous research has traditionally focused on parties’ and voters’ ideological
positions, there is an increasing interest in understanding the dynamics of issue saliency
or emphasis. Positional ideological shifts are theoretically less frequent given the stability
of political attitudes in public opinion, and the need for parties to keep a decent level
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of ideological consistency and credibility from a spatial competition perspective (Downs,
1957). Issue saliency, however, is an easier parameter to manipulate by political elites, and
potentially very effective for strategic purposes (Vis and van Kersbergen, 2007; Rovny,
2012). This is based on issue saliency or issue ownership theory (Budge and Farlie, 1983;
Petrocik, 1996; Vavreck, 2009; Pardos-Prado, Lancee and Sagarzazu, 2013), which expects
parties to highlight those issues in which they enjoy a high reputation of competence and
management (Green and Jennings, 2012).
On the basis of issue saliency theory, it is reasonable to expect that parties will strategically
attach more weight to favorable issues or dimensions of competition, and try to divert
the attention from unfavorable ones. This reasoning is based on influential issue evolution
(Carmines and Stimson, 1989) and heresthetics (Riker, 1986) theories, whereby parties
aim to structure competition by competing on a pre-existing and advantageous dimension,
or by introducing a new issue dimension that allows them to change the current structure
of party competition to their advantage. Hobolt and de Vries (2015) have extended these
expectations to multiparty contexts and found that issue entrepreneurs are more likely to
compete on a new issue dimension when they are less likely to be in office, when they have
received electoral losses, or when they are far from the mean ideological position.
When directly testing the issue entrepreneurship logic on the effects of macro-economic
performance on party strategy, it is reasonable to expect that bad economic times
should push incumbent parties to talk about non-economic issues. This is consistent with
classical issue ownership theories expecting governing (opposition) parties to talk about
the economy in good (bad) times (Vavreck, 2009), and with established retrospective
models of economic voting expecting bad performance to harm the electoral prospects of
incumbent parties (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). The implication of this reasoning is
that the winners of established dimensions of competition (i.e. incumbents) can also incur
in diversion and entrepreneurial strategies to change the issue agenda in order to prevent
potential electoral losses. Consistently with Schumacher et al. (2015), this means that
issue entrepreneurship is not only a reactive strategy from niche or small parties in order
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to find a space in the political spectrum, but also a prospective or anticipation strategy
by actors dominating the agenda and with high expectations to govern.
Tavits and Potter (2015) examine these questions from a party heterogeneity approach,
and hypothesize that economic inequality should increase left-wing parties’ attention to
economic and redistributive issues, and right-wing parties’ emphasis on identity-based
issues. The reasoning is again based on issue ownership theory (Petrocik, 1996), predicting
that social democratic parties have a better reputation than their competitors in dealing
with socio-economic inequality. When the number of voters falling below the mean income
distribution increases, the electoral constituency demanding more redistribution and being
inclined to vote for the left also increases (Romer, 1975; Meltzer and Richards, 1981). By
contrast, the incentive for right-wing parties is to deviate attention from social inequality,
prevent mainstream left domination of the issue space, and highlight other issues where
they are better equipped vis-a-vis public opinion like identity or moral concerns.
While indisputable from a point of view of socio-economic inequality, the expectation
of left-right heterogeneity fits less well into a bi-dimensional pattern of competition
between economic performance and center-periphery issues. The expectations based on
socio-economic inequality and retrospective economic voting would be contradictory.
While issue entrepreneurship theories based on socio-economic inequality would predict
right-wing governments to avoid economic issues even in scenarios of growth with high
inequality, the economic voting expectation would be the exact opposite: governing
parties should talk about the economy if the economy goes well, in order to secure
re-election. This stresses the importance of disentangling macro-economic performance
from economic inequality, and to re-direct the attention to the former. The theoretical
focus on government vs opposition is consistent with previous research on issue ownership
considering the economy to be a performance issue, whose ownership can be alternated
by left-wing and right-wing parties depending on objective conditions (Petrocik, 1996).
Recent research on issue competition highlights the importance of government-opposition
dynamics over left-right and even mainstream-niche dynamics (Seeberg, 2013; Schumacher
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et al., 2015; Pardos-Prado and Sagarzazu, 2016).
If one accepts the basic premises of retrospective economic voting models and the
performance-based character of the economy as a political issue, the incumbent vs.
opposition logic should overshadow other party categorizations like left or right. The
assumption of course is that neither center-left nor center-right parties are exceedingly
far away from the median voter position in the center-periphery dimension, which seems
like a reasonable assumption in our Spanish case study. We argue that in the context of a
strong center-periphery cleavage, governing parties will resort to non-economic territorial
issues. This is summarized in our first hypothesis:
H1: Incumbent Diversion Hypothesis: Bad macro-economic conditions will push
governing parties to highlight territorial dimensions of competition, regardless of their
left-right ideological orientation.
What are the consequences of party strategy considerations on public opinion? When
turning to the literature on economics, nationalism, and public opinion, diversionary
theory has been a successful analytical framework (Solt, 2001). According to this theory,
when economic inequality raises, the state has more incentives to increase its attention
to nationalist beliefs and deviate public attention from a bad economic situation. Despite
the intuitive appeal of this theory, however, previous tests of the relationship between
economic stress and nationalism at the individual level have suffered from endogeneity
biases, and have missed crucial steps in the causal mechanism, especially as regards
the relationship between macro-economic variation and attention to nationalism by the
incumbent party. The intermediate role of state or elite rhetoric in this process has not
been observed empirically, probably due to the difficulty of defining, measuring, and
tracking state rhetoric across countries and over time.
Recent research on other cleavages like class politics shows that parties are able to activate
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or deactivate political dimensions of conflict by polarizing more or less ideologically.
However, party strategy has not proved to be able to change left-right orientations among
the public in this process (Evans and Tilley, 2011). There is thus no reason to expect
center-periphery lines of conflict to operate differently than other established cleavages
like class politics. While polarization and changing emphasis along territorial dimensions
may allow voters to channel their concerns and to vote for their most preferred party on
the basis of that issue, parties’ strategic attempts are not necessarily going to be effective
in changing the distribution of issue concerns themselves.
The expectation that public concerns are not a systematic and direct cause of party
rhetoric is consistent with recent research on framing and persuasion effects, showing
that opinion changes in public opinion are not so easy to manipulate. Prior ideological
considerations and interest in the issue should have a very prominent role in building
cognitive shields against external party cues (Zaller, 1992; Flynn, Brendan and Reifler,
2017). More specifically, we expect voters who are concerned with the economy and
who are experiencing bad macro-economic conditions, to lose rather than gain interest
in territorial issues. Especially given that the economy can be considered as an easy
(Carmines and Stimson, 1980) and obtrusive issue that people can directly experience in
their lives, we expect party messages deviating the attention towards less direct issues in
bad economic times to be less effective than what is usually assumed.
H2: Exogenous Public Opinion Hypothesis: Bad macro-economic conditions will
diminish public opinion’s attention to territorial dimensions of competition, and party
rhetoric will not be able to counterbalance this effect.
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4 Research Design
In this section we describe the data and methods used to understand the relationship
between economic conditions and party attention to center-periphery issues. We do this
by first describing our case of study, followed by a description of the dependent and
independent variables needed to carry out the analysis.
4.1 Spain: a bipartisan-multiparty system
We test our argument by using data from Spain. While having a multiparty system, up
until the last election in 2016, Spain has functioned with a bipartisan government dynamic,
where the two largest parties have alternated in heading single-party governments.
Whenever the legislative math did not allow for a single-party majority government
agreements where made with third parties, mainly of nationalistic tendencies. For the
purpose of our analysis we cover a period of 15 years (from 1996 to 2011). This period saw
two four year periods of government by the centre-right Partido Popular (PP) followed
by two other periods of center-left government in the hands of the Partido Socialista
Obrero Espan˜ol (PSOE). These four periods not only provide variation in the ideological
orientation of the party leading the government but also see varying macroeconomic
conditions which go from a relatively good position to being one of the hardest hit
democracies during the global economic meltdown starting at the end of last decade.
4.2 Party Questioning of Government
As the purpose of our study is to measure the attention that Spanish political parties
devote to issues we rely on questions made by party members in the plenary sessions
(‘plenos’) of the ’Congreso de los Diputados’ (the Spanish parliament). It is standard
practice that during these sessions MPs ask questions to the representatives of the
government present, as shown in other studies these questions can provide insight into the
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agenda priorities of the different parties (Falco´-Gimeno and Vallbe´, 2013; Pardos-Prado
and Sagarzazu, 2016; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010; Vliegenthart and Walgrave,
2011; Hanna Ba¨ck, 2014; Slapin and Proksch, 2014; Martin and Vanberg, 2008).
Plenary debates data was obtained from the publicly available data of the Spanish
Parliament. Figure 1 shows the total number questions each party asked per Legislature.
As it can be seen the debate in parliament is dominated by the two largest parties, the
Partido Popular and the Partido Socialista. On average, both the PP and the PSOE have
a similar number of interactions per plenary despite their role as government or opposition.
The last legislature (2008-2011) sees a big drop in the number of sessions with questions
and of questions (specially by the PSOE). This behavior is consistent with mechanisms of
agenda control implemented by the PSOE to minimize its exposure due to the financial
crisis 1.
Figure 1: Questions asked per party legislature
We use these questions as the input data for the quantitative text analysis clustering
algorithm, described at length in Pardos-Prado and Sagarzazu (2016, 2017). This
algorithm estimates the distances between words and through means of proximity defines
the different word clusters -or topics-. The words for each topic are then used to define a
dictionary which is applied back to the questions. The output of this process is measures of
issue attention by the different parties on 7 different issues, of which we will solely focus
1As we will show in our robustness checks below, our main results hold if legislature fixed effects are
specified, and when testing our expectations legislature by legislature. The change in agenda-setting rules
towards the end of the time span is thus not biasing our results.
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on the economy and territorial matters (i.e. center-periphery issues)2. Table 1 shows a
sample of sentences regarding Territorial Matters3. Each issue attention variable is the
percentage of attention to an issue obtained from the counts the total number of words
in that issue mentioned by a party for a given month, over the total number of words
mentioned by a party in a month. 4
Table 1: Examples of questions to the government
VIth Legislature. May 29th, 1996
MP Luis de Grandes Pascual (PP) What criteria has the government
considered in their appointments
of their delegates to the different
Autonomous Communities?4
VIIth Legislature. October 20th, 2002
MP Jesus Caldera Sanchez (PSOE) In what type of capacity did Mr.
Arriola participate as in a State
delegation to conversations with
the terrorist band ETA?5
VIIIth Legislature. June 2nd, 2004
MP Eduardo Zaplana Herna´ndez (PP) Does the government consider that
the Congress must support without
any changes the reforms approved
by the autonomous parliaments to
their constitutions?6
VIIIth Legislature. December 15th, 2004
MP Carlos Gonzalez Serna (PSOE) What evaluation does the Government
do regarding the last round of
detentions done in the framework
of the anti-terrorist fight?7
2Tables A.6 and A.7 in the Appendix regress government and opposition agendas on macro-economic
fluctuations for each of the other issue clusters (infrastructure, international relations, education, health,
and gender). Consistently with the expectation that territorial conflicts are the second key political
dimension in Spain, our results only hold when analyzing center-periphery issues.
3Also called State Matters in Pardos-Prado and Sagarzazu (2016, 2017)
4We check the validity of our attention measure by comparing it to the attention to the domestic
politics and justice measure of the Policy Agendas Project (Chaque´s-Bonafont, Palau and Baumgartner,
2014). In a bi-variate regression, the coefficient is statistically significant and close to 2. This reassured us
about our measure capturing the attention to Territorial Matters by political parties in their questions
in Parliament.
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In order to illustrate how the attention to centre-periphery issues varies over the course
of the four legislative terms, figure 2 plots the attention that the Government and the
main Opposition party payed to the topic of Territorial Matters as a proportion of the
total time the party spoke. This figure shows two interesting dynamics that occur in the
four legislatures. First, the fact that for the most part of the period the opposition speaks
much more than the government. Second that during the VIIIth legislature the main
opposition party (the PP) increases significantly the attention to this issue in comparison
to the two previous periods. This is not only a consequence the PP trying to link the
2004 Madrid bombing before the election with nationalistic Basque terrorism, but also
to a very confrontational approach to the issue of nationalism and terrorism that the PP
had developed over the years (Bali, 2007; Montalvo, 2011).
Figure 2: Government and Opposition attention to Territorial Matters over time
VI VII VIII IX
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5Que´ criterios ha tenido en cuenta el Gobierno para la designacio´n de sus Delegados en las distintas
Comunidades Auto´nomas?
6En calidad de que participo el Sr. Arriola en una Delegacio´n de Estado para mantener conversaciones
con la banda terrorista ETA?
7Considera el gobierno que el congreso de los Diputados debe apoyar sin ninguna modificacio´n las
reformas estatutarias que aprueben los parlamentos autono´micos?
8Que valoracio´n hace el Gobierno de las u´ltimas detenciones efectuadas en el marco de la lucha
antiterrorista?
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4.3 Independent variables
To test the theoretical expectations outlined in the previous section we collected data on
the economy, public opinion and the media.
Economy: We obtained economic data from the publicly available datasets of the
Spanish Instituto Nacional de Estadistica9. We considered three indicators of interest:
unemployment, consumer price index, and economic growth. While the unemployment
and inflation (CPI) data was collected monthly the data on growth (GDP) is only available
on a three month basis, as such we only focus on unemployment and inflation as the main
macro-economic indicators.10
Public opinion: We obtained public opinion data from surveys conducted by the
Spanish Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas (CIS).11 The CIS is the national body in
charge of conducting population surveys in Spain. Of particular interest for our project are
the monthly barometers of Spanish public opinion which are carried every month except
August, when no surveys are conducted. Each barometer surveys a random sample of the
Spanish population with valid answers to our dependent variable between 2,376 and 4,874
individuals.
To measure the degree of public attention to Territorial Matters we used the
Most Important Problem (MIP) question. Respondents were asked an open-ended
question to name the most important problem facing the country today. Those who
answered “problems linked to Autonomous Regions”, “political problems in the Basque
country”, “nationalism”, “Autonomous Regions statute reforms”, “Catalan statute”, and
“terrorism” are aggregated. We therefore use the share of respondents concerned over
9www.ine.es (08/01/2018)
10Using GDP data would have decreased considerably the number of time points available in the
analysis. Moreover, after performing tests for serial correlation and trying a number of model specifications
with GDP we decided that the significant drop of valid observations and the heavily integrated nature of
GDP over time justified the exclusion of GDP from the analysis.
11See technical documentation and sampling procedures of each survey in www.cis.es (13/01/18)
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these topics as a proxy for public opinion saliency. We also use the share of respondents
mentioning the economy in the MIP question as a proxy for public opinion concern over
the economy.
Media: Data on media attention was obtained from the Policy Agendas Project
(Chaque´s-Bonafont, Palau and Baumgartner, 2014). The Policy Agendas Project coded
the front page of the two most important Spanish newspapers El Mundo and El Pais for
the presence of stories on 21 topic areas. As our interest is stories about Territorial Matters
we aggregated their data and estimated for each month in the dataset the proportion of
news stories on the topic of Domestic Politics and Justice over the total number of stories.
The result of this aggregation is a time series of overall coverage on Territorial Matters
by the two main Spanish newspapers.
Finally, we have also included in our models the attention of the Catalan and Basque
parliamentary groups to center-periphery
4.4 Statistical models
Given the structure of our data, we will specify a time series model to take into account the
serially correlated and co-integrated nature of some of our variables. More specifically, we
will specify a series of Error Correction models including the lagged dependent variable,
the lagged independent variable of interest, the monthly increase of the independent
variable of interest, and a set of lagged and differenced control variables12 (De Boef and
Keele, 2008). The three dependent variables to be regressed in this part of the analysis
will be the increase in government, opposition, and public opinion attention to territorial
matters (via parliamentary speeches and MIP survey questions, as explained above). We
have replicated our models with more flexible Autoregressive Distributed Lag models just
12Table A.3 reports a series of Dickey-Fuller tests for co-integration for all our dependent and
independent variables, and shows unsatisfactory results for MIP territorial, MIP economy, and the
unemployment rate. This is why we opted for reporting Error Correction models in the manuscript,
since the differenced specifications of our variables are not co-integrated
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predicting the contemporaneous value of our dependent variable with lagged predictors,
and our substantive conclusions remained unchanged13. Figures A.1a A.1b and A.1c in the
Appendix show the autocorrelation functions of the residuals from the time series models
reported in the manuscript, and do not suggest any obvious pattern beyond first-order
serial correlation. Table A.1 shows a number of broadly satisfactory serial correlation tests
for the models presented below14.
More specifically, the main models implemented below can be expressed as follows:
∆Yt = α + β0Yt−1 + β1Xt−1 + β2∆X + β3Zt−1 + β4∆Z + t (1)
Where,
∆Y is the monthly increase in the level of attention of a given party to center-periphery
issues
α is the intercept of the equation
Xt−1 is the lagged effect of the main independent variable of interest
∆X is the monthly increase of the main independent variable of interest
Zt−1 is a vector of lagged control variables
∆Z is the monthly increase of control variables
t is the prediction error of each observation
Subsequently, we will further test H2 (Exogenous Public Opinion Hypothesis) with
individual-level data in order to analyze the full variation of the MIP question without
aggregating it. We have pooled all the available monthly surveys and fitted a series
of Hierarchical Logit Models where individuals (level 1) are nested within months or
13See Table A.2 in the Appendix.
14Table A.1 reports robust Durbin Watson alternative tests for all models, which do not assume
exogenous regressors nor homoskedasticity in the distribution of the error term. The results are
satisfactory in all cases (p > 0.05) except for the model predicting MIP, which marginally fails the test.
Fortunately, however, the Portmanteau Q test (assessing patterns of autocorrelation beyond t-1) cannot
reject the possibility that the errors are a white noise process. We also report satisfactory Breusch-Pagan
tests for all models, which cannot reject the possibility of constant variance of the error term.
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time points (level 2). This model specification will allow us to take full profit of the
individual-level measurement of the dependent variable, and to control for potentially
omitted individual-level variables in the time series analysis such as unemployment status
(1=unemployed, 0=everything else), perceptions of the current state of the national
economy (5-point scale from very good to very bad), left-right ideology (1-10 scale
from left to right), gender (where 1=male and 0=female), age, and university education
(1=yes, 0=no). More importantly, these models will also avoid an artificial deflation of
standard errors associated with the effect of macro-economic, party, and media attention
variables measured at level 2 (Hox, 2010). More specifically, the Hierarchical Logit Models
implemented below can be expressed as:
Logit(Yit) = α + β1Xit + β2Zt−1 + β3Tt + λt + it (2)
Where,
Yit is the level of concern over territorial issues by individual i at time t
α is the average level of concern over territorial issues in the sample
Xit is a vector of individual-level covariates
Zt−1 is a vector of lagged covariates measured at the month level, like macro-economic
fluctuations, party, and media attention
Tt is a time trend λ is the random intercept parameter between months
it is the individual-level error term
5 Results
Table 2 presents three Error Correction models with government attention, opposition
attention, and public opinion attention to center-periphery issues as dependent variables
respectively. Model 1 will allow us to test our Incumbent Diversion Hypothesis (H1),
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which expected bad macro-economic conditions to push governing parties to talk about
territorial issues. Model 2 serves as a way to evaluate what makes opposition parties talk
about territorial issues. The third model in Table 2 regresses the share of respondents
who mentioned territorial issues as the most important problem facing the country, and
constitutes a preliminary test of H2.
Overall, the results from model 1 in Table 2 show a government that is apparently attentive
to public concerns over territorial issues, as shown by the strong, positive, and statistically
significant coefficient of the percentage of citizens who consider their Most Important
Problem to be related to territorial matters at t-1. This highlights a government that is
responsive to public opinion. At the same time however, and most interestingly, the results
of model 1 also corroborate our theoretical insight. Governments in bad macro-economic
conditions will try to divert attention from economic problems and highlight non-economic
territorial issues. This is not only evident in the positive and significant coefficient for the
lagged unemployment rate, but also for the positive and significant coefficient for public
concern over the economy. It is important to note that the coefficient of economic MIP
has a stronger magnitude than the coefficient of territorial MIP, and that the difference
between both coefficients is statistically significant15 . This suggests that the deviation
strategy is slightly stronger than being responsive to public opinion. Lastly, Model 1
shows that when the PP was in government its parliamentary group spoke less about
center-periphery issues than when it was in opposition (p < 0.1) ceteris paribus.
Table A.4 in the Appendix reports a series of interactions between macro-economic
indicators and a dummy indicating PP (vs. PSOE) incumbency, to assess whether
macro-economic effects are conditional on the left-right orientation of the government.
When predicting government attention, the interaction between unemployment and
PP incumbency is not significant. This validates our claim that the average effect of
unemployment increasing the incumbent’s attention to territorial issues is not dependent
on the party in government being center-left or center-right. However, the interaction
15Z test between the two coefficients is: (0.97− 0.21)/(√0.322 + 0.072)
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Table 2: Error Correction Models predicting party and public opinion attention to
territorial matters
Government Opposition MIP
Government (t−1) -1.0185*** 0.3003 -0.0693
(0.141) (0.393) (0.355)
∆ Government 0.3775 0.0118
(0.28) (0.257)
∆ Opposition 0.1051 -0.1026
(0.078) (0.135)
Opposition (t−1) 0.1357 -1.0368*** -0.0441
(0.122) (0.175) (0.211)
∆ Unemployment 0.0055 -0.0096 -0.0437**
(0.011) (0.021) (0.018)
Unemployment (t−1) 0.0212** -0.0262 0.0035
(0.009) (0.017) (0.016)
∆ Inflation -0.0116 -0.0138 -0.0331
(0.015) (0.029) (0.026)
Inflation (t−1) -0.024 -0.0118 -0.0486
(0.02) (0.039) (0.034)
∆ MIP economy 0.5696 0.5124 -0.0144
(0.435) (0.837) (0.755)
MIP economy (t−1) 0.9713*** -0.8523 -0.0637
(0.319) (0.652) (0.597)
∆ MIP territorial 0.0041 -0.127
(0.089) (0.167)
MIP territorial (t−1) 0.2141*** -0.0761 -0.2767**
(0.072) (0.15) (0.128)
∆ Media 0.2009 0.2084 0.5799**
(0.156) (0.3) (0.257)
Media (t−1) -0.224 0.6477* 0.2852
(0.206) (0.384) (0.353)
∆ Catalan Group -0.046 0.0385 -0.1709**
(0.047) (0.091) (0.077)
Catalan Group (t−1) -0.0213 0.0203 -0.1991
(0.073) (0.138) (0.12)
∆ Basque Group -0.0584* 0.0354 0.012
(0.03) (0.06) (0.054)
Basque Group (t−1) -0.0678 0.0619 0.0078
(0.047) (0.091) (0.082)
PP Government -0.0478* -0.0967** 0.0228
(0.025) (0.047) (0.044)
Intercept -0.1102 0.6074** 0.1359
(0.136) (0.244) (0.233)
N 63 63 63
R2 0.646 0.607 0.408
Log Likelihood 125.064 84.796 91.535
-171.409 -90.873 -104.351
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.0121
between PP incumbency and inflation is negative and barely significant (p < 0.1). This
means that when there is inflation, PP incumbents are less likely to talk about territorial
issues than PSOE incumbents. This could be consistent with Hibbs (1987) and Hibbs
and Vasilatos (1982), who expect right-wing parties to be more affected by inflation and
left-wing parties by unemployment. The marginal significance and small magnitude of the
interaction, however, push us to be cautious regarding the interpretation of this result.
When analyzing opposition attention, only the interaction between PP opposition and
unemployment is significant. This means that when there is unemployment, PP is less
likely to talk about territorial issues than when PSOE is in opposition. This just shows
that PP has no incentives to divert the attention to territorial issues if in opposition
and with high unemployment, which is something very intuitive and consistent with issue
ownership theory, but not a direct test of any of our hypothesis.
Model 2 in Table 2 shows a slightly different story. The opposition seems to be much more
responsive to the media than to anything else, as shown by the positive and significant
(p < 0.1) coefficient of the attention to Territorial Matters on the front page of two of
the main Spanish newspapers. This is consistent with previous research analyzing party
attention to the economy, and showing that opposition discourse tends to follow the media
when highlighting issues that can harm the incumbent (Pardos-Prado and Sagarzazu,
2017). Model 2 also shows that when in the opposition the PP speaks significantly more
about territorial matters than the PSOE (as shown by the negative and robust effect of
the dummy capturing PP incumbency).
Model 3 in table 2 regresses the share of respondents concerned with territorial conflicts,
and reveals several important findings. First, the lagged unemployment rate is an
important driver of public opinion concern. More specifically, a unit of increase in
unemployment from one month to another is associated with a decrease of more than half
a standard deviation of territorial MIP (0.57 units). If one takes into consideration the
wide range of unemployment figures that Spain has experienced over the last decade, the
magnitude effect is quite considerable. Second, media attention is also heavily correlated
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with public attention. This is consistent with an intuitive agenda-setting effect, even if
it is impossible to disentangle the direction of causality (i.e. whether media attention
shapes public opinion concern or vice versa). Third and more importantly, the effect of
government and opposition rhetoric is far from reaching conventional levels of significance.
This is consistent with H2 above, expecting partisan cues to be less effective when a direct
and obtrusive issue (i.e. bad economic conditions) can be directly observed by individuals
themselves. This suggests that partisan diversion strategies are less effective at setting
the public debate than what one may expect. More intuitively, the worse the economy
is doing, the less public concern towards territorial issues is likely to be observed. Public
concern over center-periphery issues can be associated with media attention (as shown in
our models) or with structural or bottom-up changes in public opinion that are beyond
the scope of our study.
It is important to focus on the effects of regional or nationalist parties in the first model of
Table 2. Contrary to the intuitive assumption that center-periphery issues are an exclusive
domain of regional parties, the coefficients of Basque and Catalan party attention to
regional issues have a null impact on the government and opposition agendas, as well as
on national public concerns. If anything, the effect would appear to be negative for Basque
party attention on the government’s agenda (b=-0.06; p < 0.1), and for Catalan party
attention on public opinion (b=-0.17; p < 0.05). Table A.5 in the Appendix replicates
the models shown in Table 2 but with Catalan and Basque party attention to regional
matters as dependent variables. Those models show consistently insignificant effects of
macro-economic variables, and negative (though barely significant) effects of state-wide
incumbent attention to territorial issues. This confirms previous research (Field and
Hamann, 2015) suggesting that regional parties do not systematically frame their discourse
in center-periphery terms at the national arena, and that both state-wide and regional
parties can unilaterally turn to regional matters without being pushed to do so by other
parties. Our models are consistent with the idea that state-wide incumbents try to divert
the attention towards territorial affairs when the economy goes badly, but that regional
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parties do not do the same. Our analyses, however, do not test whether regional parties
are able to directly shape public opinion at the regional level.
It could be argued, however, that model 3 in table 2 aggregates an essentially
individual-level variable (i.e. MIP) and masks important patterns in the data. In order to
rule out this possibility, we pooled all the available individual-level monthly datasets from
1996 to 2011 using individual concern over territorial issues as our dependent variable.
We modeled its variation through a myriad of Hierarchical Logit Models in Table 3,
clustering individuals within time points (i.e. surveys or months). No matter whether
modeled on their own (Model 1), with macro-economic covariates (Model 3), or in a
fully specified model with individual-level controls (Model 4), measures of party attention
to territorial and identity issues are always far from reaching statistical significance. By
contrast, bad macro-economic conditions (both unemployment and inflation rates) are
consistently associated with less concern over territorial issues. These findings go along
the prediction of our second hypothesis. As the economy worsens and public opinion
shifts to more concern over the economy, the public’s attention to state matters will
diminish. Unemployment, inflation, and bad economic evaluations reduce the likelihood
of being concerned with territorial issues. Right-wing ideology, being female, being older,
and having a university degree also increase the probability to be concerned with territorial
issues.
Finally, it is important to stress once again that there is no evidence in our data that
diversion towards territorial issues in bad economic times is only a right-wing strategy. We
tested whether government attention has a more persuasive effect on public opinion only
when the conservatives are in power. Contrary again to the idea that territorial diversion
is only a right-wing strategy (i.e. as right-wing narratives could be more associated with
the idea of a unified and centralized Spain), the interaction between government rhetoric
and PP incumbency (see the last model in Table A.4 in the Appendix) is very far from
reaching conventional levels of significance.
As regards the Hierarchical Logit Models, it is important to stress that government
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Table 3: Hierarchical Logit Models predicting MIP territorial
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Government attention (t−1) -3.182 -1.512 -1.531
(3.28) (2.13) (2.15)
Opposition attention (t−1) 3.582 -2.515 -2.512
(2.77) (1.99) (2.02)
Time trend 0.027*** 0.115*** 0.136*** 0.136***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Unemployment (t−1) -0.396*** -0.432*** -0.431***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Inflation (t−1) -0.328* -0.398** -0.395**
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19)
Unemployed status -0.116
(0.17)
Economic perceptions -0.089*
(0.05)
Left-right ideology 0.200***
(0.02)
Gender -0.881***
(0.09)
Age 0.011***
(0.00)
University degree 1.129***
(0.08)
Intercept -10.533*** -17.746*** -19.654*** -20.071***
(0.91) (3.83) (4.10) (4.16)
Intercept variance 2.99*** 0.93 0.91 0.93
(0.68) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
N individuals 173503 173503 173503 173503
N time 100 100 100 100
Log Likelihood -3582 -3548 -3547 -3359
AIC 7174 7106.1 7107.7 6744.2
BIC 7224.3 7156.4 7178.1 6875.1
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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rhetoric does not have a significant impact when the PP is in power either. When
looking at whether conservative incumbents are at least able to condition concerns among
conservative voters or right-wing individuals, the interactions turned up as insignificant.
As shown in Tables A.8, A.9, and A.10 in the Appendix, our hierarchical models predicting
individual-level issue concern are robust to the inclusion of regional party rhetoric, media
attention, electoral terms fixed-effects, and interactions between party discourse and
macro-economic conditions.
6 Conclusion
Governments in bad economic times rely on short-term rational strategies intended to
avoid electoral punishment, and try to distract voters into other topics where they
might fare better (Vavreck, 2009; Pardos-Prado and Sagarzazu, 2017). Paradoxically,
however, this short-term office-seeking behavior can widen the gap between the incumbent
and public opinion’s agenda, and exacerbate the so-called representation crisis in
contemporary liberal democracies. This is consistent with the contribution of Solaz
and De Vries (2017) in this volume, who show a similar dynamic by looking at
different dimensions of competition (i.e. libertarian-authoritarian), units of analysis (i.e.
country-year), and sources of party emphasis (i.e. expert surveys). As opposed to previous
literature focusing on economic inequality (Tavits and Potter, 2015), when analyzing
macro-economic fluctuations and incumbent vs. opposition strategies, important diversion
strategies emerge both in the left and the right sides of the political spectrum. This finding
makes sense as a pure electoral strategy, as governing parties want to avoid having an issue
that is hurting them in the agenda no matter whether they are right-wing or left-wing
(Vavreck, 2009; Petrocik, 1996).
In light of the fact that governing parties sometimes need to shy away from the topic
of the economy, it is necessary to explore to what topic(s) they divert attention to.
Based on the literature on issue entrepreneurship and heresthetics (see for instance, Solt,
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2001; Tavits and Potter, 2015), we have argued that when economic indicators are not
performing governing parties will increase the attention they devote to center-periphery
and territorial issues if they are salient, regardless of their political orientation. Contrary
to the common expectation that diversion strategies are ultimately followed by losers of
the political game trying to shift competition towards a more favorable dimension, our
findings suggest that regional issue entrepreneurship can also be proactively undertaken
by winners or incumbents without being pushed by any regional party (Schumacher et al.,
2015). Our findings confirm that regional or nationalistic parties do not have the monopoly
of center-periphery narratives (Field and Hamann, 2015; Alonso, Cabeza and Gomez,
2015), and that they are not particularly effective at driving the agenda of state-wide
parties or public opinion.
At the same time, however, we have argued that citizens do not directly respond to
partisan diversion strategies. Instead, in the presence of bad macro-economic conditions,
citizens concern over economic issues will increase while public opinion’s attention to
territorial issues will diminish. This novel and more direct test of the consequences
of diversion strategies on representation complement the pessimistic implications of
other studies focusing on different outcomes like accountability (Solaz and De Vries,
2017). Concerns over territorial, identity, or center-periphery issues seem to be more
associated with media attention and with structural indicators proxied by gender,
age, education, and left-right ideology. While our study refutes the idea that the
reactivation of center-periphery conflicts in cases like Scotland or Catalonia are directly
due to party emphasis, it rather highlights an important mismatch between citizens
and their representatives, especially in bad economic times. This can only exacerbate
a possible disconnect between mainstream governing parties and significant sectors of the
public.
By using a novel dataset of parliamentary speeches in Spain over four electoral
cycles (1996-2011) that witnessed major economic shocks under different ideological
incumbencies, we are able to partially avoid the endogeneity problems of previous research
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in the area. Our speeches data allow us to measure the attention that different parties give
to different issues. Of particular interest in this paper is the attention that parties give
to territorial issues. We merged this data with indicators of public opinion concern over
the economy and center-periphery; macro-economic indicators; and media attention. Our
focus on longitudinal variation, our tests on serial correlation, and the myriad of robustness
checks shown in the Appendix were reassuring about the validity of our findings. However,
no observational study is immune to unobserved variable biases. Future research should
both narrow down the identification of the drivers of issue emphasis, and test whether the
diversion and representation mismatch that we found can be exported to new geographical
and institutional contexts.
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Appendix I. Robustness checks for time series
analyses
Figure A.1: Autocorrelation of model residuals in Table 2
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Table A.1: Robustness checks Table 2
Government Opposition MIP
Durbin Watson 1.729 1.856 2.307
DW critical values (19, 63) (19, 63) (19, 63)
Durbin’s alternative test 2.489 0.026 5.872
Breusch-Pagan test 22.99 16.43 9.63
Residuals Portmanteau test 48.777 24.558 22.132
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Table A.2: Replication of Table 2 with ADL models
Government Opposition MIP
Oppositiont−1 0.0020 0.0018
(0.071) (0.207)
Governmentt−1 -0.1302 0.4993
(0.250) (0.348)
Unemploymentt−1 0.0168*** -0.0074 -0.0372*
(0.005) (0.010) (0.019)
Inflationt−1 -0.0145 -0.0026 0.0014
(0.013) (0.025) (0.036)
MIP economyt−1 0.6775*** -0.2988 -1.7156**
(0.242) (0.484) (0.678)
MIP territorial t−1 0.1863*** -0.0525
(0.055) (0.111)
Media t−1 -0.1472 0.6324** 0.4074
(0.134) (0.255) (0.354)
Catalan groupt−1 0.0337 0.0067 -0.1224
(0.040) (0.076) (0.105)
Basque groupt−1 -0.0037 0.0104 0.0707
(0.027) (0.053) (0.075)
PP government -0.0660*** -0.1055*** 0.1765***
(0.019) (0.038) (0.048)
Constant -0.0381 0.4784*** 0.6652**
(0.094) (0.151) (0.296)
N 67.000 67.000 64.000
F 4 6 8
R-sqr 0.382 0.495 0.572
LogLik 127.430 83.784 58.669
BIC -212.812 -125.520 -75.749
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table A.3: Dickey-Fuller tests assessing co-integration
p value
Government attention 0
Opposition attention 0
MIP territorial 0.46
Unemployment 0.77
Inflation 0
MIP economy 0.49
Media attention 0
Catalan group attention 0
Basque group attention 0
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Table A.4: Replication of Models from Table 2 with Interactions with Economic Variables
Gov’t × Gov’t × Oppo × Oppo ×
MIP
Unemp Inflation Unemp Inflation
Oppositiont−1 0.006 -0.007 -0.042 0.049 0.010
(0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.14) (0.21)
Governmentt−1 0.423
(0.41)
Unemploymentt−1 0.018** 0.016*** 0.014 -0.009 -0.035*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Inflationt−1 -0.014 0.002 -0.005 -0.047 0.003
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
MIP Economyt−1 0.700** 0.571** -0.899* -0.512 -1.647**
(0.27) (0.24) (0.48) (0.48) (0.71)
MIP Territorialt−1 0.182*** 0.175*** 0.027 -0.082
(0.06) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11)
Mediat−1 -0.142 -0.147 0.449* 0.585** 0.414
(0.14) (0.13) (0.25) (0.26) (0.36)
Catalan groupt−1 0.035 0.032 -0.014 0.006 -0.111
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11)
Basque groupt−1 -0.004 -0.006 0.029 0.018 0.070
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08)
PP Government -0.042 -0.052** 0.123
(0.11) (0.02) (0.16)
PP Gov’t × Unemp -0.002
(0.01)
PP Gov’t × Inflation -0.048*
(0.03)
PP Opposition 0.658*** 0.076*
(0.20) (0.04)
PP Oppo × Unemp -0.047***
(0.02)
PP Oppo × Inflation 0.070
(0.05)
PP Gov’t × Government 0.302
(0.83)
Constant -0.052 -0.017 0.111 0.393** 0.643**
(0.12) (0.09) (0.19) (0.18) (0.30)
N 67.000 67.000 67.000 67.000 64.000
LogLik 127 129 88 85 59
F 3.470 3.990 7.001 5.830 7.112
R-sqr 0.383 0.416 0.556 0.510 0.573
AIC -232.912 -236.647 -154.158 -147.627 -95.497
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.5: Explaining attention to Territorial matters by Regional party groups
Catalan group Basque group
∆ Catalan group 0.017
(0.23)
Catalan groupt−1 -1.226*** 0.299
(0.14) (0.34)
∆ Basque group 0.007
(0.10)
Basque groupt−1 -0.030 -1.175***
(0.15) (0.15)
∆ Government -0.455 -1.321*
(0.47) (0.69)
Governmentt−1 -1.110* -0.748
(0.63) (0.99)
∆ Opposition 0.106 0.223
(0.25) (0.38)
Oppositiont−1 0.800** -0.106
(0.37) (0.59)
∆ Unemployment -0.043 0.035
(0.03) (0.05)
Unemploymentt−1 0.042 0.032
(0.03) (0.04)
∆ Inflation -0.050 -0.036
(0.05) (0.07)
Inflationt−1 -0.068 -0.040
(0.06) (0.10)
∆ MIP Economy 0.795 1.866
(1.39) (2.09)
MIP Economyt−1 1.382 1.721
(1.08) (1.65)
δMIP Territorial -0.583** 0.094
(0.26) (0.42)
MIP Territorialt−1 -0.042 0.608
(0.25) (0.37)
∆ Media 0.051 0.504
(0.50) (0.75)
Mediat−1 -0.925 -1.439
(0.64) (0.97)
PP Government -0.052 -0.099
(0.08) (0.12)
Constant 0.030 0.199
(0.43) (0.65)
N 63 63
LogLik 53 27
F 6.942 5.187
R-sqr 0.740 0.680
AIC -67.788 -15.622
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
36
Table A.6: ADL Regression for other issues: Opposition
Infrastructure Int Relations Education Health Gender
Governmentt−1 0.045 -0.126 -0.040 -0.002 -0.054
(0.12) (0.13) (0.06) (0.12) (0.12)
Unemploymentt−1 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.006** -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Inflationt−1 -0.011 0.012 0.013 -0.006 -0.015**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
MIP Economyt−1 -0.137 0.057 -0.201 0.123 0.296**
(0.26) (0.39) (0.17) (0.24) (0.12)
Catalan groupt−1 0.090* 0.084 0.024 0.089 -0.022
(0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03)
Basque groupt−1 0.039 -0.043 -0.077** -0.005 0.050
(0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
PP Government -0.005 0.010 -0.014 0.036** 0.014
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Constant 0.066 0.201** 0.087** -0.002 0.020
(0.05) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
N 75.000 75.000 75.000 75.000 75.000
LogLik 125 95 160 131 180
F 0.962 0.695 1.459 2.790 2.483
R-sqr 0.091 0.068 0.132 0.226 0.206
AIC -233.417 -174.458 -304.563 -246.411 -344.390
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.7: ADL Regression for other issues: Government
Infrastructure Int Relations Education Health Gender
Oppositiont−1 -0.027 0.153 0.231 0.085 0.213**
(0.15) (0.11) (0.22) (0.13) (0.11)
Unemploymentt−1 -0.007** 0.006 -0.007** -0.001 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Inflationt−1 -0.005 -0.012 -0.020 -0.004 0.017**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
MIP Economyt−1 -0.303 0.338 -0.379 0.067 -0.257**
(0.28) (0.37) (0.30) (0.25) (0.12)
Catalan groupt−1 0.013 -0.007 0.054 0.065 -0.004
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
Basque groupt−1 -0.014 0.059 0.039 -0.020 0.037
(0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
PP Government 0.014 0.015 -0.018 0.006 -0.024***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Constant 0.214*** 0.149** 0.267*** 0.105** 0.018
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02)
N 75.000 75.000 75.000 75.000 75.000
LogLik 121 100 116 128 185
F 1.707 0.632 1.418 0.326 3.380
R-sqr 0.151 0.062 0.129 0.033 0.261
AIC -225.730 -183.976 -215.824 -239.907 -353.525
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
38
Appendix II. Robustness checks for Hierarchical Logit
Models
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Table A.8: Hierarchical Logit Models predicting MIP territorial
h1 h2 h3
Government -3.0118 18.6076 18.8208
(2.311) (11.508) (11.472)
Opposition -3.1092 -9.6285 -9.6233
(2.039) (6.565) (6.566)
PP Government 1.6158
(1.574)
PP Government × Gov’t 13.1075
(8.283)
Unemployment -0.4190*** -1.2158 -1.2173
(0.072) (0.742) (0.743)
Inflation -0.3929** 0.2977* 0.2982*
(0.188) (0.157) (0.157)
Unemployed status -0.1157 -0.3060 -0.3055
(0.166) (0.733) (0.733)
Economic perceptions -0.0907* -0.3713* -0.3635*
(0.052) (0.217) (0.214)
Left-Right Ideology 0.2003*** -0.0390 -0.1748
(0.022) (0.106) (0.321)
Gender -0.8816*** -1.1497*** -1.1489***
(0.090) (0.360) (0.360)
Age 0.0109*** 0.0255*** 0.0253***
(0.002) (0.009) (0.009)
University degree 1.1294*** 0.1899 0.1911
(0.085) (0.367) (0.367)
Time trend 0.1328***
(0.047)
Vote PSOE 0.7920
(7.569)
Vote PP 0.0316
(1.210)
Left-right × Gov’t -0.8063
(2.015)
Intercept -19.6548*** -6.4024** -6.3741**
(4.419) (2.616) (2.612)
Intercept variance -0.0612 0.2208 0.2213
(0.128) (0.303) (0.303)
N individuals 173,503 76,539 76,539
N time 100 46 46
LogLik -3357.598 -327.113 -327.063
BIC 6896.155 811.663 800.318
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.9: Hierarchical Logit Models predicting MIP territorial
h4 h5
Government attention 1.2219 -2.1654
(4.078) (2.282)
Opposition attention -2.6589 -2.3119
(2.946) (2.160)
Regionalist parties 0.3615
(0.818)
Media -12.6135***
(4.642)
Unemployment -0.5845*** -0.1604**
(0.122) (0.072)
Inflation -0.5118* 0.1202**
(0.295) (0.057)
Unemployed -0.2247 -0.1061
(0.199) (0.168)
Economic perceptions -0.1791*** -0.0970*
(0.058) (0.053)
Left-right ideology 0.2198*** 0.1995***
(0.024) (0.022)
Gender -0.8790*** -0.9101***
(0.098) (0.092)
Age 0.0092*** 0.0104***
(0.003) (0.002)
University degree 1.0307*** 1.1245***
(0.093) (0.086)
Time trend 0.1629**
(0.070)
Legislatura VI 0.0000
(.)
Legislatura VII 17.2678
(383.630)
Legislatura VIII 18.5492
(383.631)
Legislatura IX 17.3531
(383.631)
Intercept -22.6957*** -25.1340
(6.350) (383.630)
Intercept variance 0.0375 -0.0332
(0.162) (0.134)
N individuals 111,350 165,878
N time 65 96
LogLik -2717.345 -3270.300
BIC 5608.997 6720.886
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.10: Hierarchical Logit Models predicting MIP territorial
h6 h7
Government -2.6143 0.2448
(2.362) (3.782)
Opposition -2.4341 -2.5975
(1.993) (2.021)
Unemployment -0.4058*** -0.4169***
(0.064) (0.064)
Inflation -0.3767** -0.3951**
(0.192) (0.192)
Gov’t × Unemp 0.4420
(0.428)
Gov’t × Inflation -0.1787
(0.315)
Unemployed status -0.1159 -0.1159
(0.166) (0.166)
Economic perception -0.0893* -0.0896*
(0.052) (0.052)
Left-Right Ideology 0.2003*** 0.2003***
(0.022) (0.022)
Gender -0.8815*** -0.8815***
(0.090) (0.090)
Age 0.0109*** 0.0109***
(0.002) (0.002)
University degree 1.1294*** 1.1294***
(0.085) (0.085)
Time trend 0.1338*** 0.1303***
(0.046) (0.047)
Intercept -20.0750*** -19.2754***
(4.139) (4.350)
Intercept variance -0.0521 -0.0399
(0.126) (0.125)
N ind 173,503 173,503
N time 100 100
LogLik -3358.599 -3358.960
BIC 6886.092 6886.816
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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